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[ Crim. No. 5375.

In Bank.

Sept. 18, 1953. J

THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. EVAN CHARLES THOMAS,
Appellant.
[1] Homicide-Instructions-Murder.--It is proper to instruct jury
that murder which is perpetrateu by lying in wait is declared
by law to be first degree murder and that, if jury should find
that defendant committed that crime, it will have no choice
but to designate offense as first degree murder.
[2] !d.-Murder in First Degree-Killing by Lying in Wait.Where a murder is shown to have been committed by "lying
in wait," a showing of specific intent is unnecessary to fix the
degree, such offense having heen d'"signated as first degree murder by Pen. CodP, ~ 189.
[3] !d.-Appeal-Harmless and Reversible Error-Instructions.An instruction in a murder case that "Where the killing is by
'lying in wait,' and the act causing death was intentional, it
is murder of the first degree whether the killing was intentional
or unintentional," while not as exaet as it might be, did not
result in prejudiee to defendant where it was contained in a
definition of the expression "lying in wait," in which the court
correctly set forth physical aspects of' the act, where court
made it sufficiently clear that act of lying in wait alone did
not constitute the crime hut that when rnunleT had been established and was found to have been committed by lying in wait
as that act was defined in instruction the law fixes the degree
of the crime, where considering instructions as a whole it was
clear that court's reference to a "killing" was reasonably understood by jury to be a killing which constituted murder, and
where court had fully and correctly instructed jury on distinction between first and second degree murder.

APPEAL (automatically taken under Pen. Code, § 1239)
from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County
and from an order denying a new trial. Charles 'vV. Fricke,
JudgE'. Affirmed.
Prosecution for murder.
degree murder, affirmed.

,Judgment of conviction of first

[2] See Cal.Jur., Homieidc, ~ 12 et seq.; Am.Jur., Homicide,
15, 16.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Homicide, ~ 185; [2] Homicide,
§ Fi(5); [3] Homicide, § 267.
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Al Mattbews and .John Olivrr for Appellant.
Edmnnd G. Brown, Attorney <ieneral, ~wd Frank Richards,
Deputy Attorney Oennral, for Respondent.

SHENK, ,J.--'l'he defendant was found guilty of murder
in the first degree without recommendation. The victim was
Nina Marie Bice. A motion for a new trial was denied and
the extreme penalty was imposed. On this appeal, automatically taken under Penal Code, section 1239 (b), the sole contention of the defendant is that the court misdirected the jury
by giving an improper instruction on "lying in wait," hereinafter quoted in full.
The defendant was charged by information in count I that
on or about August 29, 1951, he wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and with malice aforethought murdered Nina Marie
Bice. In counts II, IV, VI, VIII, X and XII he was charged
with the attempted murder of each of several persons he shot
at but failed to kill. In counts III, V, VII, IX, XI, and
XIII he was charged with assault with a deadly weapon on
each of those same persons. The defendant pleaded not guilty
and not guilty by reason of insanity to each of the 13 counts.
At the commencement of the trial the prosecution moved for
a severance of count I from all the other counts. The defense
agreed to the severance and the motion was granted. Thereupon the defendant withdrew his plea of not guilty by reason
of insanity as to count I. Following the conviction on count
I the other counts were ordered off calendar.
The facts of this case are not in dispute. In the evening of
April 15, 1952, the defendant paid a social call on a neighborhood woman in Los Angeles Colmty. He left at approximately
10 p.m., and shortly thereafter a shot was fired through the
front window of the woman's home, injuring no one. Upon
questioning by the sheriff's deputies the following day, the
defendant admitted he fired the shot. A stenographic statement was taken at this time. In the statement the defendant
related the following additional shootings:
On August 27, 1951, he shot at his first victim, a woman
waiting at a corner telephone booth at about 10 :30 in the
morning. The bullet entered below the left shoulder blade.
1<-,ollowing· surgery she recovered from the wound. On August
28, 1951, he shot through the front window of a home, injuring
no one.
On August 29, 1951, between 10 and 10 :30 p.m. he shot and
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killed Mrs. Nina Marie Bice. She was sitting on a stool next
to the counter of a small lunch stand located at 1021 Atlantic
Boulevard in Los Angeles County. The defendant stated that
he noticed her as he drove by on his way to work; that he
drove down an alley and stopped at a distance of about 200
feet from the lunch counter; that he took a .22 caliber rifle
from under the back seat of his car; that he shot once at the
woman, trying to knock a coffee cup out of her hands ; that
he saw her slump over the counter, and that he started his
car and drove past the lunch counter where the victim had
been laid out on the ground. The bullet entered the deceased's
right ear killing her immediately.
On October 16, 1951, at 8 o'clock in the morning, the defendant shot at an 11-year-old schoolgirl, standing on a corner
waiting for a bus. The bullet shattered a bone in the girl's
forearm.
On November 23, 1951, at about 9:30 in the morning the
defendant shot at a woman working in her yard with her son
and daughter and three of their friends. The bullet entered
her right thigh and was removed by surgery.
On December 25, 1951, at about 10 :30 in the evening the
defendant shot through a window at a woman ironing in her
home. The bullet entered her abdominal cavity and lodged
in a position where it was too hazardous to be removed.
With the exception of the final shooting, the defendant
stated that he was acquainted with none of the women at
whom he shot or at whose homes he shot. He purchased the
.22 caliber rifle, used in each instance, in July, 1951, and carried it under the rear seat of his automobile. In some cases
he shot from the automobile, and in others from outside of
it. The only reason given for the shootings was that in some
of the cases he experienced a sexual satisfaction while in the
commission of the act or shortly thereafter.
On April 17, 1952, a sworn statement was taken from the
defendant in the office of the district attorney. The statement
was substantially the same as that taken by the sheriff's deputies the previous day and recited the same facts, although
in greater detail than above related. Again the defendant
gave no motive, other than the sexual satisfaction he experienced.
At the trial the two statements made by the defendant were
read into the record. The victims, with the exception of the
deceased, testified as to the shootings and other witnesses
testified as to the shooting of the deceased. There was ex-
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pert testimony to the effect that the defendant, a married
man, led a frustrated sexual life at home and the shootings were an outlet for his sexual drive in his particular case.
Expert opinion as to the defendant's mental ability varied
from ''subnormal'' to ''above average.'' The only testimony
given by the defendant was that he had been in an automobile accident in 1948 and was rendered unconscious for six
hours, and that during the remainder of the year 1948 he
suffered headaches. The court ruled that this did not open
up to cross-examination the entire field of the defendant's
conduct. The defendant was not examined in court as to
the commission of the acts charged against him.
The defendant contends that because there is no proof that
he had intent to kill, a properly instructed jury would have
returned a verdict of murder of the second degree. Section
189 of the Penal Code reads as follows: ''All murder which
is perpetrated by means of poison, or lying in wait, torture,
or by any other kind of wilful, deliberate, and premeditated
killing, or which is committed in the perpetration or attempt
to perpetrate arson, rape, robbery, burglary, mayhem, or any
act punishable under Section 288, is murder of the first degree;
and all other kinds of murders are of the second degree.'' The
section purports to set forth the degree of a crime previously
determined to be "murder." "Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being, with malice aforethought." (Pen.
Code, § 187.)
[1] The court correctly instructed the jury on murder
by lying in wait as follows :
"Murder which is perpetrated by lying in wait is declared
by our law to be murder of the first degree, and if you should
find that the defendant committed that crime, you will have
no choice but to designate the offense as murder in the first
degree.''
The defendant brings into question the further instruction
of the court defining "lying in wait":
"The words 'lying in wait' do not refer to the position of
the body of the person who commits a killing. There may
be a 'lying in wait' within the meaning of the law where such
person is sitting down, standing or to a degree moving about.
The gist of 'lying in wait' is that the person places himself
in a position where he is waiting and watching and concealed
from the person killed with the intention of inflicting bodily
injury upon such person or of killing such person. There
is nothing in the law that requires that the 'lying in wait'
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exist for or consume any particular period of time before
the firing of a shot or other act which caused the death. It
is only necessary that the act causing death be preceded by
and the outgrowth of the 'lying in wait.'
"Where the killing is by 'lying in wait,' and the act causing death was intentional, it is murder of the first degree,
whether the killing was intentional or unintentional, as in
such case it is not necessary that there exist in the mind
of the perpetrator an intent to kill.''
The defendant contends that the instruction was improper
because it permitted the jury to convict of first degree murder
where there was no evidence of a specific intent to kill.
[2] But where a murder is shown to have been committed
by 'lying in wait' a showing of intent is unnecessary to fix
the degree. In People v. Bernard, 28 Cal.2d 207, it is stated
at page 211 [169 P.2d 636] : " . . . the murderer who kills
by torture or poison may intend only to inflict suffering,
not death. Evidence of the means used might support an
inference that the killing was willful, deliberate, and premeditated, but where the jury has found that the killing was
by poison, lying in wait, or torture it is not their [the jury's]
function to go farther and draw inferences as to the manner
of the formation and carrying out of an intention to kill. In
such a case the question which the statute (Pen. Code, § 189)
answers affirmatively is not 'Is the killing willful, deliberate
and premeditated~' ; it is, 'Is the killing murder of the first
degree ? ' Killings by the means or on the occasions under
discussion are murders of the first degree because of the substantive statutory definition of the crime." (See, also, People
v. Tuthill, 31 Cal.2d 92, 99 [ 187 P .2d 16].)
The defendant relies upon an excerpt from People v. Howard (1930), 211 Cal. 322, 329 [295 P. 333, 71 A.L.R. 1385],
where it is stated: "To be murder of the first degree, under
our statute, the killing must be premeditated except when
done in the perpetration of certain felonies; that is to say,
the unlawful killing must be accompanied with a deliberate
and clear intent to take life.'' In that case the deceased died
from a blow on the head received in the course of a struggle
following an argument with the defendant. It was held that
the evidence did not show that the murder was wilful and
deliberate. 'l'he question of murder by lying in wait was not
in issue, and the statement of the court cannot fairly be construed to mean that where a murder by lying in wait is committed it cannot be murder of the first degree nnless accompanied by proof of a specific intent to kilL
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[3] As above noted the eourt instrueted the ,jury that
"'Vhere the killing h;; by 'lying in wait,' and the aet causing
death was intentional, it is murder of the first degree whether
the killing was intentional or unintentional. . . . " It is
contended that this is not a complete statement of the law;
that under such an instruction one could be convicted of
murder of the first degree where by lying in wait he sought
merely to play a prank upon the deceased but instead created
circumstances which caused death, and that the instruction
ignores the provisions of the Penal Code which presuppose
that a "murder" as distinguished from a "killing" has been
committed, in which event it is of the first degree if perpetrated by lying in wait.
It may be assumed that the instruction standing alone is
not as exact as it might be. Still no prejudice to the defendant resulted therefrom. It was contained in a definition of
the expression "lying' in wait." Therein the court correctly
set forth the physical aspects of the act. It made it sufficiently
clear that the act of lying in wait alone did not constitute
the crime but that when mur'der had been established and was
found to have been committed by lying in wait as that act
was defined in the instruction the law fixes the degree of the
crime. Considering the instructions as a whole it is clear
that when the court made reference to a "killing" it was
reasonably understood by the members of the jury to be a killing which constituted murder. The court had fully and correctly instructed the jury on the distinction between first and
seeond degree murder and on all aspect:>' of the law applicable
to the facts including intent and how it could be manifested
and proved. It had instructed that "you are not to single
out any certain sentence, or any individual point or instruction, and ignore the others, but you are to consider all the
instructions as a whole, and are to regard each in the light
of all the others.''
The defendant was convicted on undisputed evidence. He
had a full and a fair trial. No reason has been advanced
which would justify a reversal.
The judgment and the order denying the motion for a new
trial are affirmed.
Gibson, C. ,J., Traynor, J., and Spence, J., concurred.
'l'RAYNOR, ,J.-1 concur, but wish to amplify the reasons
for my concurrence.
Two basic questions are presented on this appeal: (1) Was

476

PEOPLE

v.

THOMAS

[41 C.2d

the instruction on lying in wait erroneous~ (2) Was the
evidence insufficient to warrant thP giving of an instruction
on lying in wait 1
The instruction on lying in wait 1 was erroneous in stating,
"Where the killing is by 'lying in wait', and the act causing
death was intentional, it is murder of the first degree, whether
the killing was intentional or unintentional, as in such case
it is not necessary that there exist in the mind of the perpetrator an intent to kill.''
A ''killing'' by means of lying in wait is not murder of
the first degree unless it is first established that it is murder.
Only then can the question arise whether it is murder of the
first degree because perpetrated by lying in wait. Under
the instruction given an unintentional killing that did not
amount to murder would nevertheless be murder of the first
degree. This error is fundamental.
The following statutory definitions of murder, malice aforethought, and first degree murder must first be carefully
considered.
''Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being, with
malice aforethought.'' (Pen. Code, § 187.)
"Such malice may be express or implied. It is express
when there is manifested a deliberate intention unlawfully
to take away the life of a fellow-creature. It is implied, when
no considerable provocation appears, or when the circumstances attending the killing show an abandoned and malignant heart." (Pen. Code, § 188.)
''All murder which is perpetrated by means of poison, or
lying in wait, torture, or by any other kind of willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing, or which is committed
in the perpetration or attempt to perpetrate arson, rape,
robbery, burglary, mayhem, or any act punishable under
1
" The words 'lying in wait' do not refer to the position of the body
of the person who commits a killing. There may be a 'lying in wait'
within the meaning of the law where such person is sitting down, standing or to a degree moving about. The gist of 'lying in wait' is that
the person place himself in a position where he is waiting and watching
and concealed from the person killed with the intention of inflicting
bodily injury upon such person or of killing such person. There is
nothing in the law that requires that the 'lying in wait' exist for or
consume any particular period of time before the firing of a shot or other
act which caused the death. It is only necessary that the act causing
death be preceded by and the outgrowth of the 'lying in wait.'
"Where the killing is by 'lying in wait,' and the act causing death was
intentional, it is murder of the first degree, whether the killing was intentional or unintentional, as in such case it is not necessary that there
exist in the mind of the perpetrator an intent to kill.''
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Section 288 [lewd or lascivious act against a child], is murder
of the first degree; and all other kinds of murder are of the
second degree." (Pen. Code, § 189.)
Section 189 does not state that a "killing" perpetrated
by one of the enumerated means is murder of the first degree.
It speaks only of "murder" that is so perpetrated. In People
v. Coefield, 37 Cal.2d 865 [236 P.2d 570], the defendant, who
had been convicted of murder of the first degree for a
killing committed in the perpetration of a robbery, pointed
out that "murder" is the grammatical antecedent of "which"
in the clause "which is committed in the perpetration or
attempt to perpetrate . . . robbery," and contended that
the killing was accidental and was therefore not with malice
aforethought and was therefore not "murder" committed
in the perpetration of a robbery, and accordingly was not
murder of the first degree. We rejected this contention, holding not only that "malice is shown by the nature of the
attempted crime, and the law fixes upon the offender the
intent which makes any killing in the perpetration of or
attempt to perpetrate the robbery a murder of the first
degree'' but that ''in such a case the jury had no option but
to return a verdict of murder of the first degree, whether
the killing was done intentionally or accidentally." (37
Cal.2d at 868, 869.) It is contended that since the poisoning
or torturing of another or lying in wait to take him unawares
involves substantial risk to human life, malice should also
be found in the nature of such acts, and that a killing resulting therefrom should likewise be held to be murder of
the first degree whether it was done intentionally or accidentally. Section189, however, when read in the light of other
sections of the Penal Code and the decisions of this court, is
not amenable to that construction.
By the use of the phrase ''or any other kind of willful,
deliberate, and premeditated killing" (italics added) following the phrase ''All murder which is perpetrated by
means of poison, or lying in wait, torture," the Legislature
identified murder committed by any of the enumerated means
as a "kind of" willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing.
Ordinarily, to prove that a killing was willful, deliberate,
and premeditated, evidence must be introduced from which
the trier of fact can determine the state of mind of the defendant before he eommittecl the act that resulted in his
victim's death, that is, whether the killing resulted from a
deliberate intention to take human life.

478

PEOPLE

v.

THOMAS

[41 C.2d

If the killing is murder within the meaning of Penal Code,
sections 187 and 188, and is by one of the means enumerated
in section 189, the use of such means makes the killing as a
matter of law the equivalent of ''a willful, deliberate, and
premeditated killing.'' Since any question as to the defendant's willfulness, deliberation, and premeditation is taken
from the trier of fact by force of the statute (People v.
Bernard, 28 Cal.2d 207, 211 [169 P.2d 636] ; People v. Murphy,
1 Cal.2d 37, 41 [ 32 P .2d 635] ; see, also, the illuminating discussion in the early case of Riley v. State (1849), 28 Tenn.
646, 660-661), it bears emphasis that a ''killing'' by one of
the three means enumerated in the statute is not the equivalent
of a "willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing" unless
it is first established that it is murder. Thus, if it is contended
that a murder was committed by means of poison, it is not
enough to show that a poison was administered and that a
death resulted. If the poison was innocently given under the
belief that it was a harmles drug and that no serious results
would follow, there would be no malice, express or implied,
and any resulting death would not be murder. (People v.
Milton, 145 Cal. 169, l70-171 [78 P. 549] .) If, however, the
defendant administered poison to his victim for an evil purpose, so that malice aforethought is shown, it is no defense
that he did not intend or expect the death of his victim.
(People v. Cobler, 2 Cal.App.2d 375, 380 [37 P.2d 869] ; see
People v. Bernard, S1tpra, 28 Cal.2d 207, 211.) Similarly,
in the case of a killing by torture, it is not enough to show
that the killing was by a means that incidentally caused pain
and suffering to the victim. (People v. Bender, 27 Cal.2d
164, 177-178 [163 P.2d 8] .) It must be established that the
defendant intended to ''cause cruel suffering on the part of
the object of the attack, either for the purpose of revenge,
extortion, persuasion, or to satisfy some other untoward propensity." (People v. Tubby, 34 Cal.2d 72, 77 [207 P.2d 511 ;
People v. Daugherty, 40 Cal.2d 876, 886 [256 P.2d 911] ;
People v. Mat·tinez, 38 Cal.2d 556, 561 [241 P.2d 224].) The
defendant need not intend that his victim die as a result of
the torture, since his intention to commit acts that involve a
substantial risk to human life makes him guilty of first degree
murder if a death results. (People v. Tubby, supra, 34 Cal.
2d 72, 77.)
\Vhen it is contended that a killing is murder of the first
degree on the ground that it was committed by lying in wait,
it must likewise first be established that the killing was
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murder. 2 If the killing was not murder, it cannot be first
r!egrer mnnlPr. and it is immaterial that the defendant was
lying in wait. OtherwisP, absurd rPsults might follow. Thus,
a defendant might lie: in wait to frighten a person. Unknown
to defendant, that person might have a defective heart. His
death from a heart attack as a result of the fright would not
be murder. Again, a killing that unintentionally results from
a fist fight is ordinarily involuntary manslaughter. (People
v. Le G1·ant, 76 Cal.App.2d 148, 152 [172 P.2d 554]; People
v. Miller, 114 Cal.App. 293, 301 [299 P. 742] .) If the defendant lay in wait for his victim to engage in a fist fight
with him and the victim dies as a result of the fight, that
fact alone is not sufficient to make it the equivalent of a
"willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing."
The instruction was also erroneous in stating that defendant
was lying in wait if he was ''waiting and watching and
concealed from the person killed with the intention of inflicting bodily injury upon such person or of killing such
person.'' \Vhen read with the last paragraph of the instruction, the foregoing language directed the jury to find defendant guilty of first degree murder if he intended "bodily
injury." That definition falls short of the definition of
murder in sections 187 and 188 of the Penal Code. It is
true that murder may be committed without a specific intent
to take human life if the killing is committed under circumstances that show an abandoned and malignant heart. To
be so committed, however, the defendant must intend to
commit acts that are likely to cause death and that show a
conscious disregard for human life. (See People v. Torres,
94 Cal.App.2d 146, 150 [210 P.2d 324] [striking victim with
knife]; Peo1Jle v. Sernone, 140 Cal.App. 318, 324 [35 P.2d
379] [firing shotgun at trespassers] ; People v. Hubbard,
64 Cal.App. 27, 37 [220 P. 315] [shooting with intent only
to wound) ; People v. Stein, 23 Cal.App. 108, 114 [137 P.
271] [firing shots at random into crowded dance hall).) As
we have seen in considering the first error discussed above,
a mere intent to inflict ''bodily injury,'' amounting to an as2
ln the California cases involving murder by lying in wait, there was
no contention that the killing was not murder; the only question was
whether it was of the :first or second degree. (People v. Bernard, 28
Cal.2d 207 [169 P.2d 636] [victim struck with deadly weapon] ; People
v. Tuthill, 31 Cal.2d 92 [187 P.2d 16] [victim shot with intent to kill];
People v. Vnkich, 201 Cal. 290 [257 P. 46] [same]; People v. Miles, 55
Cal. 207 [same]; People v. Gibson, 92 Cal.App.2d 55 [206 P.2d 375]
fvictim stabbed].)
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sault and battery at most, would not be enough to constitute
murder if a killing resulted therefrom.
From the foregoing discussion it is apparent that the
instruction on lying in wait was defective largely because
the court failed to explain that murder must first be established
before the question of lying in wait can arise. \¥ithout such
an explanation the instruction was not only misleading but
a gross misstatement of the law. We would be compelled
to hold that the instruction was prejudicial and resulted
in a miscarriage of justice, if there was evidence in the record
from which a reasonable jury could conclude that the killing
was not murder. There is no such evidence.
Defendant confessed that he shot at Mrs. Bice for sexual
pleasure. In one statement he said that she "had her
coffee cup in her hand getting ready to drink her coffee which
was what I was really aiming at . . . she had it right in
front of her face.'' In another statement he said that he
simply ''aimed at the woman in the stand, and pulled the
trigger and drove off.'' He said that he knew he was a poor
shot. Under these circumstances there can be no doubt that
malice must be implied and that the killing was murder. An
intent to kill is not necessary for murder. Malice is implied
"when the circumstances attending the killing show an
abandoned and malignant heart." (Pen. Code, § 188.) That
is shown when, as here, the defendant for a base, antisocial
motive and with wanton disregard for human life, does an
act that involves a high degree of probability that it will result
in death. By his own admissions defendant's conduct demonstrates that he was not averse to endangering life for the
sake of the sexual pleasure it gave him. Only a person with
an ''abandoned and malignant heart'' could value the attainment of that pleasure more highly than human life. Since
even if a proper instruction had been given, the jury could
have come to no other conclusion than that the killing of Mrs.
Bice was murder, the instruction did not result in a miscarriage of justice unless there was insufficient evidence to
warrant the giving of any instruction on lying in wait.
We thus reach the crucial issue in this case : Was the
evidence sufficient to warrant the giving of an instruction
on lying in wait 1
Lying in wait requires the elements of waiting, watching,
and concealment for the purpose of taking a victim unawares.
(People v. Tuthill, 31 Cal.2d 92, 100-101 [187 P.2d 16] ;
Barnards v. State, 88 Tenn. 183, 227 [12 S.W. 431] .) It
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does not mean that the defendant's body must be in a lying
position; it is immaterial whether he is lying, sitting, standing, or moving about, so long as the elements of waiting,
watching, and concealment are all present for the purpose
of taking the victim unawares. (People v. Repke, 103 Mich.
459, 468 [61 N.W. 861]; State v. Walker, 170 N.C. 716, 718
[86 S.E. 1055] .) The defendant may either wait for his
victim to come to his place of hiding or he may go to a
hiding place near his victim and wait for a favorable moment
to murder him. (People v. Repke, supra, 103 Mich. 459, 468.)
The duration of the waiting, watching, and concealment
necessary to constitute lying in wait cannot be arbitrarily
fixed in units of time, just as the time necessary for the
ordinary willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing cannot
be so fixed. There must, however, ,be substantial evidence
of a long enough period of waiting and watching in concealment to show a state of mind equivalent to premeditation
and deliberation before the court can properly give an instruction on lying in wait. It is now settled that a mere
specific intent to kill is not enough to constitute first degree
murder under the classification of "any other kind of willful,
deliberate, and premeditated killing,'' and that there must be
substantial evidence that the intent to kill was arrived at
as a result of premeditation and deliberation. (People v.
Holt, 25 Cal.fd 59, 90-91 [152 P.2d 21] ; People v. Thomas,
25 Cal.2d 880, 901 [156 P.2d 7]; People v. Honeyctltt, 29
Cal.2d 52, 61 [172 P.2d 698]; People v. Valentine, 28 Cal.2d
121, 131 [169 P.2d 1].) I£ it is claimed that the murder was
by one of the means enumerated in section 189, there must
also be substantial evidence of the use of such means. Thus
in the case of murder by lying in wait it is not enough that
the victim be unaware of the presence of his assailant until the
fatal wound is inflicted. It is also necessary that there be
substantial evidence of the elements of waiting and watching.
Otherwise a killing that was the result of a rash impulse would
be converted into first degree murder.
In my opinion if the only evidence in this case was that
with respect to the murder of Mrs. Bice, it would not be
sufficient to sustain a finding of murder by means of lying
in wait. Defendant saw deceased, a stranger to him, as he
drove by in his automobile. He then drove around the block
and parked in an alley in a position from which he could
shoot at her. Standing alone, this evidence supplies no clue
41 C.2d-16
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as to whether defendant was waiting and watching for an
opportunity to shoot at any victim who might present herself,
or formed the intent to shoot only after the opportunity
presented itself. Moreover, the fact that after seeing his
victim, he drove round the block and parked in a position
from which he could shoot, is not, when considered by itself,
evidence of lying in wait. His victim was then at hand. He
did not drive round the block into the alley to watch and
wait for her but only to enable him to shoot her. .Any delay
in doing so after he had located his victim in an exposed
position would not contribute to his success in executing his
crime, but only increase the possibility that his victim might
escape by moving from the area of danger. Thus unless defendant was watching and waiting for his victim before he
came upon her, the murder was not committed by means of
lying in wait.
The shooting of Mrs. Bice was not an isolated incident. On
six other occasions defendant shot at women under similar
circumstances. He carried his rifle with him in his automobile.
His only motive for the shootings was sexual gratification.
From this evidence the jury could reasonably infer that
defendant drove about the city waiting and watching for whatever victims might present themselves. They could infer
that he was waiting and watching for a victim on the night
when he murdered decedent. Since in addition the murder
was committed from a position of concealmeht, all of the
elements necessary to constitute murder committed by means
of lying in wait were present, and it was not error to present
that theory to the jury.
Edmonds, J., concurred.
SCHAUER, J.-I dissent.
Excepting his :final conclusions, I agree with and adopt
Justice Traynor's discussion and statement of the law as
expressed in his concurring opinion. I do not agree that
the evidence shows murder by lying in wait.
Furthermore, even if we accept the theory of lying in wait
advanced in Justice Traynor's opinion, I do not believe the
judgment of :first degree murder can properly be sustained.
It should not be sustained because no instruction so defining
~ying in wait was given to the jury and the record therefore
fails to show-indeed it indicates the contrary-that the jury
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ever passed on the issues and found the facts essential to
support the verdict on the theory described.
The evidence is ample to establish murder in the second
degree and in my view both the law and justice would be
better served by reducing the judgment of conviction to
murder of the second degree and, as so reduced, affirming it.
CARTER, J.-I dissent.
I cannot agree that the evidence is sufficient to support a
judgment of murder of the first degree. The judgment
cannot be sustained on the theory of lying in wait as the evidence falls far short of establishing this ground and the jury
was not instructed on the law applicable thereto. The evidence is sufficient to support a judgment of murder of the
second degree and I would modify the judgment accordingly
and affirm it as so modified.
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied October
15, 1953. Carter, ,T., and Schauer, J., were of the opinion
that the petition should be granted.
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THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. JOHN SUTIO, Appellant.
[1] Homicide-Murder in First Degree-Deliberation and Premeditation.-A homicide is murder of first degree when the
accused, as result of deliberation and premeditation, intended
to take unlawfully the life of another. (Pen. Code, § 189.)
[2a, 2b] !d.-Evidence-Deliberation and Premeditation.-There
was ample evidence to sustain a conviction of first degree
murder where two weeks before defendant had a quarrel with
decPased's parents over an unpaid egg bill, had used "harsh
words" in discussing it, and had poisoned their dog; where he
had made verbal threats to kill deceased's father; where he
(1] See Cal.Jur., Homicide, § 14; Am.Jur., Homicide, § 14.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Homicide, § 15(2); [2] Homicide,
§158; [3] Homicide, §15(4); [4] Homicide, §163; [5] Homicide,
§ 15 ( 5) ; [ 6] Homicide, §§ 242, 246, 273; [7] Criminal Law, § 727;
[8] Homicide, § 190; [9] Criminal Law, § 1285; [10] Criminal
Law, § 961; [11] Homicide, § 118; [12] Criminal Law, § 1080 (5) ;
[13] Criminal Law, § 628(1a); [14] Criminal Law, § 1098; [15]
Criminal Law, § 619; (16] Criminal Law, § 1407(6).

